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Abstract 
 
 
This article critiques R. Keith Sawyer’s theory of social causation from his 2005 book Social 
Emergence. It considers his use of analogy with the philosophy of mind, his account of individual 
agency, the legacy of Emile Durkheim, the concepts of supervenience, multiple realization, and wild 
disjunction, and the role of history in social causation. Sawyer’s theory is also evaluated in terms of two 
examples of empirical research: his own micro-sociological studies into group creativity; and Margaret 
Archer’s macro-sociology of education systems. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This article is a critique of the theory of social causation advanced by R. Keith Sawyer in his 
2005 book Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. In Social Emergence and 
contemporaneous articles, Sawyer proposed an approach to a key challenge of sociological 
theory - namely, to provide ‘an account of the individual-collective relation’ (Sawyer 2003a, 
203) – based upon insights derived from an analogous relation within the philosophy of mind 
between physical brain-states and mental properties. Hence, just as some philosophers have 
defended the reality of mental causation against the implications of reductive physicalism, so 
Sawyer defended the reality of social causation1 against a reductive interpretation of 
methodological individualism (MI).2 In terms of social ontology, his theory is a form of what 
he called ‘nonreductive individualism’ (NRI).3 
Sawyer’s work is not only theoretical; he is also an empirical researcher and has always insisted 
that causation, ‘cannot be debated strictly on a theoretical level’  (Sawyer 2012, 272) and that, 
‘for any given sociological phenomenon the extent to which individualism or collectivism is a 
useful part of the complete explanation must be determined through empirical study’ (Sawyer 
2003a, 219). If this is correct, then there may be no a priori justification for privileging either 
an MI account of causation for empirical research or, on the other hand, a collectivist (or holist)4 
account – the reason being because, again, the nature of causation may, following Sawyer, only 
be decided through methods of specific inquiry.  
                                               
1 Social causation is usually referred to just as ‘causation’ for the sake of brevity. 
2 The abbreviation MI is used from this point on in the text. 
3 The abbreviation NRI is used from this point on in the text. 
4 For the sake of conciseness, this article refers to ‘collective’ and ‘collectivist’ rather than ‘holist’  and 
‘holism’. 
Page 3 of 30 
 
Pursuing this line of argument, this article offers two examples of empirical research as a way 
of critiquing Sawyer’s theory. The first is Sawyer’s own qualitative research into ‘group 
creativity’, specifically, acting and improvisation in the theater (Sawyer 2003bc; Sawyer 2005, 
170-188); the second is Margaret Archer’s (1979/2013) historical sociology of the development 
of state education systems in four countries between 1789 and 1975. These examples are 
chosen for three reasons: first, because they provide a combination of micro-sociological 
(Sawyer) and macro-sociological (Archer) perspectives; second, because Sawyer maintained 
that his theoretical work was ‘inspired’ by his own empirical research (Sawyer 2002a, 559); 
and third, because Sawyer claimed an affinity between his theory and Archer’s critical realism 
(Sawyer 2003a, 218-219) whilst at the same time criticising her account of causation (Sawyer 
2001, 570). Archer (2013, 21-22) subsequently responded to these criticisms. The dialogue 
between Sawyer and Archer, therefore, provides an interesting aspect of the critique of Sawyer. 
The structure of the article follows a sequence of exposition, critique, and evaluation. The next 
two sections provide an exposition of Sawyer’s theory (II) and discuss some critiques (III) 
including Sawyer’s use of philosophical analogy, his approach to individual agency, the legacy 
of Emile Durkheim, the concepts of supervenient causation, multiple realization and wild 
disjunction, and the role of history in causation. Concluding remarks (IV) suggest which 
elements of Sawyer’s theory remain of sociological value. 
II EXPOSITION 
Sawyer advanced his theory in a series of articles in the early 2000s, culminating in the 
publication of Social Emergence in 2005.5 His starting-point was a central problem of 
sociological theory: ‘the tension between individualism and collectivism’ (Sawyer 2002a, 551), 
                                               
5 The articles preceding the book are significant because Sawyer conceded (2005, 65) in Social Emergence that 
their content appeared there in only a ‘condensed version’. 
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often referred to as the ‘individualism-holism debate’ (see Zahle 2016). Sawyer clarified this 
tension by reference to ‘the slippery concept of emergence’ (Sawyer 2001, 551-553), which 
emphasised how the claim that collective phenomena are emergent from the actions of 
individuals is compatible with both MI and collectivism. Emergence as a concept is ‘slippery’, 
Sawyer argued, because its core idea, that the collective is related to the composition of its 
parts, can be interpreted epistemologically and ontologically. If it is interpreted 
epistemologically, then collective phenomena are compatible with MI insofar as they are 
interpreted as the aggregate of individual actions which exist, qua psychological properties, 
‘in’ the minds of individuals who then orientate their actions towards the social meanings of 
the collective. This type of MI is associated canonically with the work of Max Weber (Weber 
2013). It seems clear, though, that this epistemology rests upon a prior ontological 
commitment: the axiom that, in sociological terms, ‘only individuals exist’ (Sawyer 2002a, 
537). 
However, as Sawyer pointed out, emergence can also be interpreted in a way conducive to 
collectivists. Sawyer’s examples here included Archer and Roy Bhaskar (1994). According to 
this reading, what emerges at the collective level is not only irreducible to the individual level 
but exercises causal power, or in Durkheim’s (1895/1982) terms, ‘external constraint’, over 
individuals through a process of ‘downward causation’. In this schema, downward causation 
stands in contrast to the ‘upward causation’ of MI. Moreover, when downward causation enters 
the picture it is no longer possible to interpret collectivism just epistemologically, as a 
descriptive short-hand which is predicated upon a more fundamental, or ‘rock bottom’ 
(Watkins 1971, 271), ontology expressed in terms of individual action. For, insofar as causation 
is predicated upon the actions of real social forces, collectivism is only intelligible if it is based 
upon an ontology of social properties which exist, as Durkheim claimed, sui generis, over and 
above the individual. 
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By introducing the possibilities of upward and downward causation, Sawyer emphasised how 
a theory of causation cannot be separated from social ontology and his interpretation of it: NRI. 
One of the key concepts of NRI is supervenience. Making use of the analogy with philosophy 
of mind, supervenience permitted Sawyer to retain the ontological axiom that ‘only individuals 
exist’ (Sawyer 2002a, 537) whilst still arguing for the causal power of downward causation.  
If ‘only individuals exist’ then that causal power must derive from its ‘supervenience base’ in 
individual human beings. But Sawyer’s version of NRI is ‘non-reductive’ because he conceived 
of no a priori reason why the collective level should be reducible to the individual level. This 
is because of the contrast between token identity and type identity and an account of 
supervenience that stressed the existence of multiple realization and wild disjunction (Sawyer 
2002a, 2005). 
Token identity and type identity denote two versions of the supervenience relation. Both are 
committed to a materialist ontology. Token identity denotes a relation of reduction in which a 
property at a higher level can be reduced down to its physical supervenience base at a lower 
level: examples from the philosophy of mind include such experiences as ‘being in pain’, which 
supervenes upon certain neurological brain-states.  It seems clear that the token identity relation 
is implicated in the question of causation: for if each token of the higher level can be reduced 
down to the lower level upon which it supervenes then it seems reasonable to assume that the 
higher level is ‘upwardly’ caused by the lower level and not vice versa. If this were true then 
the higher level would be what Sawyer (2003a, 204) called ‘causally inert’, or 
‘epiphenomenal’, and there could be no downward causation.  
Epiphenomenalism has been a problematic concept within the philosophy of mind and it is also 
problematic for collectivists. It was for this reason that Sawyer contrasted token identity with 
type identity. Conceding that a commitment to materialism entailed a commitment to token 
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identity, Sawyer nonetheless emphasised its difference from type identity. Whereas token 
identity simply references the fact that psychological and social events can be re-described in 
the physicalist language of the lower ontological level because they are ultimately physical 
events, type identity references more complex social phenomena which it would be laborious, 
or even impossible, to re-describe without a sociological taxonomy.   
This latter issue was related to an argument Sawyer derived from Jerry Fodor (1974). The 
argument is that it is plausible to uphold the autonomy of the ‘special sciences’ on account of 
the fact that no scientific reduction of the concepts of a higher-level discipline may be reducible 
to a lower-level discipline. Fodor was chiefly resisting the reduction of psychology to 
neurology but Sawyer argued from analogy to apply this irreducibility thesis to the relations 
between sociology and psychology. According to this argument, a sociological ‘type’ is not 
reducible to its individual components because each instantiation of it may be realized by 
multiple individual properties. This is the meaning of multiple realization: any instantiation of 
a sociological ‘type’ may ‘be realizable not only by a single compound...but by different - in 
fact indefinitely many - compounds of individual properties’ (Zahle 2016). This is more than 
just a reference to social complexity. Sawyer argued not only that sociological ‘types’ 
supervene upon a multiply realized individual supervenience base but that this base may be 
wildly disjunctive. Again, he followed Fodor’s analysis and argued from analogy: there may be 
no a priori reason why a multiply realised supervenience base instantiates a relationship of 
regularity with its emergent level of a scientific status. It may do; but whether it does or does 
not is an empirical, not a theoretical, question which Sawyer, following Fodor, repeatedly 
emphasised. Both Fodor and Sawyer stressed that the empirical fact of wild disjunction was a 
probability rather than a possibility so that the picture of society that emerges is one in which 
social properties clustered as sociological ‘types’ supervene upon individual properties which 
are so heterogeneous (wildly disjunctive) that no empirical regularity of a scientific status can 
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be established between the sociological ‘type’ and the individual supervenience base from 
which it emerges. Thus, NRI is non-reductive: what resists reduction is the sociological ‘type’ 
to its individual supervenience base (Sawyer, 2002a, 2003a, 2005). 
Sawyer concluded that NRI constitutes a defence of sociological collectivism and, what 
followed from that, a defence of social causation against the claims of MI. At the same time, 
NRI remained ontologically individualist. Sawyer called this account of social causation, 
supervenient causation (SC).6 
SC defends the possibility of downward causation. Sawyer stated this defence in collectivist 
terms: ‘this account of social causation does not require any commitment to intentionality or 
agency on the part of individuals’ (2002a, 537) Diagrammatically, Sawyer represented SC in 
the following way: 
Place Figure 1 here. 
 
Figure 1: social and individual causal relations. Note: t= time (Sawyer, 2003a: 208) 
Two points about this diagram and its arrows (>) of causation are relevant to the critique of 
section III. 
                                               
6 Supervenient causation is referred to by the abbreviation SC for the rest of the article. 
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1. Its Durkheimian influence. One of Sawyer’s articles of the early 2000s was called 
‘Durkheim’s Dilemma’ and it was only slightly amended in 2005 in Social Emergence. 
‘Durkheim’s Dilemma’ re-read Durkheim as an ‘emergence theorist’ (2002b, 231) and 
this allowed Sawyer to shed new light on the central formula of The Rules of 
Sociological Method (1982): ‘social facts’ are therein characterised by the quality of 
‘external constraint’ which they exercise over individuals. For Sawyer, this constituted 
a theory of downward causation.  Expressed in terms of the arrows of causation of 
Figure 1, S has causal power over I*; that is, S constrains I*, with ‘constraint’ 
interpreted to include physical violence at one end of a spectrum and moral persuasion 
at the other (Sawyer 2002b, 237-238). Significantly, for Sawyer, S’s constraint of I* 
‘does not require a theory of the individual, subjectivity, or agency’ (ibid., 232) 
although, confusingly, ‘constraint’ also turned out to entail a ‘dialectic between 
downward causation’ - the arrow signified by the number 1 in Figure 1 - ‘and emergent 
processes’ (ibid., 238) - the dotted vertical lines connecting I to S at time t1 and I* to S* 
at time t2. The dialectical process needs to be stressed because SC is predicated upon it: 
in Figure 1, S constrains I* whilst at the same time supervening upon I. That is the core 
characteristic of NRI. The ‘confusion’ noted above is discussed further in section III. 
2. The synchronic but not diachronic account of social causation. Somewhat counter-
intuitively, Sawyer argued that the antecedent history of a social property played no 
role in its causation and that only its ‘present’ individual-level supervenience base 
possessed causal power.  That claim is disputable; but it has an internal logic considered 
strictly within the terms of the theory. To return to Figure 1: if this is seen as an 
ahistorical snapshot of a structural moment in time then Sawyer’s (2003a, 210) claim 
that ‘supervenience is a synchronic claim’ makes sense. The rationale is based on the 
ontology of NRI and the analogy with ontological materialism within philosophy of 
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mind. So, just as non-reductive materialism held to the axiom that, ‘there is nothing in 
the universe other than physical matter’ (Sawyer 2001, 555), so NRI held to the axiom 
that ‘only individuals exist’ (Sawyer 2002a, 537). Because token identity applied for 
NRI, every social property must supervene upon individual properties at one particular 
moment in time and that relation is fundamentally ‘asymmetric’ (ibid., 543): the 
changes of causal consequence are those occurring in the individual supervenience 
base. As Sawyer (2003a, 210) described it in terms of Figure 1: ‘I determines S and I* 
determines S* (dotted vertical lines). But as a synchronic claim, supervenience does not 
apply to processes of causal determination over time’. As will be seen in the next 
section, despite Sawyer’s expressions of affinity between SC and Archer’s critical 
realism, where the primacy of the synchronic over the diachronic elements of causation 
are concerned, he and Archer sharply diverged. 
III CRITIQUE 
The analogy with the philosophy of mind 
One feature of the articles that preceded Social Emergence was the pervasiveness of the 
analogy with the philosophy of mind. The argument for this was that the ‘mind-brain 
relation…can be generalized to apply to any hierarchically ordered sets of properties’ (Sawyer 
2001, 553). Sawyer was not alone in finding this analogy useful (see Zahle 2003, 78) and his 
employment of it was instructive. On the other hand, it had limitations, especially the concept 
of ‘contiguous levels of analysis’ (Sawyer 2003a, 218) connecting the putative ‘levels’ 
physical/mental and individual/social. 
Sawyer’s starting-point was the consensus that ‘all that exists is physical matter’ (Sawyer 2001, 
555), and it was from this basis that he endorsed nonreductive materialism from within the 
philosophy of mind. Because he was transposing to a higher level of analysis – from 
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physical/mental to individual/social - Sawyer argued that NRI was an analogy at that level of 
analysis with nonreductive materialism. However, the relation of the physical/mental to the 
individual/social is, arguably, more than an analogy; it is a relation of subsumption in which 
ontological individualism within sociology stands to ontological materialism within 
philosophy in the same way that a species stands to a genus. This point is not just about 
explanatory ‘levels’; it is ontological, because society is constituted of diverse materialities of 
which individual human beings are just one. Other relevant materialities include: the natural 
world, technology, language, social groups, and the structures of macro-sociology such as the 
economy, the State, and the law. The materiality of the law, for example, consists of written-
down statutes and the infrastructure of law courts, prisons and legislatures - in other words, not 
just individual judges, police officers, and so on. Of course, Sawyer was aware of this: the final 
chapter of Social Emergence (Sawyer 2005, 211) outlined his ‘emergence paradigm’ which 
extended the ‘levels of analysis’ to include, at the lowest level, individual properties and at the 
highest level, social structure, where he located ‘written texts’ including ‘laws’ and 
‘infrastructure’. Yet, despite this, it remained unclear how such structures figured in examples 
of causation, except that they exercised ‘constraint’. Exactly how the economy, the State, or 
the law exercised constraint was never made clear. Sawyer’s most persuasive demonstration of 
SC in action - his own ‘group creativity’ research outlined below (2003bc) - was a micro- rather 
than a macro-level example. By contrast, his examples of higher-level social properties, such 
as ‘competitive team sports’ (Sawyer 2002a, 549-551), ‘being a church’ (ibid., 542-551), or 
the ‘sex ratios’ of species (Sawyer 2012, 272), were either abstractions or rested upon 
biological analogies which lacked application in his own research. 
Individual Agency 
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The ‘levels of analysis’ argument had further limitations, related to Sawyer’s confusing account 
of individual agency. This led to a fallacy of transposition from the physical/mental to the 
individual/social. On many occasions Sawyer (2003a, 218) affirmed that, 
‘although social properties are supervenient on individual properties, the causal force of social properties does not 
have to be mediated through a conscious awareness of them on the part of individuals. The above analysis applies 
to any pair of contiguous levels of analysis without any consideration of subjectivity, intentionality, or 
consciousness’. 
 
The problem here was that the analogy was transposed uncritically. So committed was Sawyer 
to his ‘levels of analysis’ argument that he failed to see a possible limitation: that certain 
individual properties – agency, consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity– may not be 
analogous to their ‘contiguous levels’ (physical and social properties). Or: if they appear 
analogous in their logical form, they are not in their phenomenological content. Thus, there 
may be a ‘decisive asymmetry between the relation of mental and physical descriptions on the 
one hand and social and individual descriptions on the other hand’ (Greve 2012, 190-191). It 
was this that led to the fallacy of transposition from physical/mental to the individual/social: 
‘the argument originated in the philosophy of mind to provide an account of how mental facts cause…neurological 
events, and obviously an individual neuron has no internal representation of the overall conscious state of mind. 
The analogical argument for SC of the mental does not require a theory of agency or subjectivity, because mental 
causation is thought to exist even though neurons have no agency. Similarly, SC is an account of social causation 
in which social properties may cause individuals to behave in certain ways, and it does not require a theory of 
agency or subjectivity’ (Sawyer 2003a, 218). 
 
‘Of course’, Sawyer conceded, ‘there are myriad differences between people and neurons, and 
collectives and people’, but nonetheless he maintained that ‘the argument holds’ (ibid., 221). 
However, one indication that the argument may not hold is the example of his own qualitative 
studies into group creativity. These also permit an investigation of the extent to which Sawyer’s 
empirical research supported his theory of SC, an issue made relevant by his repeated assertion 
that ‘the relation between any given set of higher- or lower-level properties is an empirical 
question to be determined by empirical study (Sawyer 2005, 69). 
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Sawyer’s interest in social emergence itself emerged from prior studies into micro-level 
interactions in music and theater performance. Some of these were reproduced as chapter 9 of 
Social Emergence and they were also the theme of two contemporaneous books (2003bc). Their 
findings demonstrated SC at the micro-level. So, in the case of improvised (‘improv’) theater 
performances without rehearsed plots, characters or scripts, Sawyer showed how the individual 
properties instantiated in each actor's individual ‘turn’ led to the emergence of the social 
property of an improvised ‘scene’, even though no author or actor had pre-designed it. Sawyer 
pointed out that the emergent social property was caused by the ‘collaborative efforts of the 
entire group’ in the form of dialogue and non-verbal behaviours from which ‘stable macro-
patterns emerge[d]’ (Sawyer 2005, 182-184). Sawyer also used this example to reinforce the 
claim that SC, ‘does not require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of 
individuals’ (2002a, 557) because the ‘stable macro-patterns’ of improvised theatre emerged 
as social properties despite the fact that they were neither planned nor designed by individual 
actors.  
However, the analysis of ‘improv’ acting highlighted the confusion in Sawyer’s account of 
individual agency. His research identified no less than ‘eight different improv games’ each 
‘defined by a unique set of rules’ which his actors drew upon to ensure spontaneity on stage 
(Sawyer 2003b, 238). ‘Improv games’ required the learning of specific rules, such as ‘don’t 
write the script in your head’ (ibid., 61), the breaking of which was considered a ‘cardinal sin’ 
(Sawyer 2003c, 56). After learning these rules, actors had to then enact them by taking a ‘turn’ 
on stage with each actor’s individual ‘turns’ co-creating the overall ‘scene’. So, whilst Sawyer 
convincingly demonstrated SC and the causal power of the ‘interactional frame’ (Sawyer 2005, 
182-184), becoming a ‘skilful group performer’ (Sawyer 2003c, 9) also required this process 
of learning and following the rules, which, for an effective ‘scene’ to occur, had, contra Sawyer 
(2003a, 218), ‘to be mediated through a conscious awareness of them on the part of 
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individuals’. Thus, the improvised ‘scene’ exhibited ‘property dualism’ (Sawyer 2002a, 543): 
it possessed both social properties (the ‘interactional frame’) and individual properties 
(learning and following rules) and therefore demonstrated both downward causation and 
emergent processes. This is consistent with the theory of SC; but it also required the mediation 
of individual consciousness and, therefore, demonstrated individual agency. This is not 
compatible with Sawyer’s (2002a, 537) claim that SC ‘does not require...agency on the part of 
individuals’. 
Durkheim 
The fallacy of transposition also affected Sawyer’s interpretation of Durkheim. In fact, there 
were two incompatible theories that Sawyer derived from Durkheim: one deterministic and 
stressing solely downward causation; the other ‘dialectic’ and compatible with SC. It was the 
deterministic Durkheim that committed the fallacy of transposition, with the ‘levels of analysis’ 
argument again to the fore. Thus, in ‘Durkheim’s Dilemma’, Sawyer used the analogy to argue 
that ‘there could be no systematic relations between phenomena at the two levels’ (Sawyer 
2002b, 242-243), with the individual/social levels configured on the model of the 
physical/mental levels and causation itself conceived of as primarily downward causation.  This 
version of Durkheim relegated the individual properties of agency and intentionality to the 
status of ‘folk theories’ (Sawyer 2003a, 221). At the same time, however, Sawyer also drew on 
Durkheim to provide a persuasive account of SC. This was a dialectical interpretation: 
‘Durkheim realized that social constraint occurred within a dialectic between downward 
causation and emergence processes...a form of constraint that is simultaneously undergoing 
processes of emergence’ (Sawyer 2002b, 238). This interpretation fitted well with Sawyer’s 
own theater research, but the problem remains that even there he was clearly of the opinion 
that ‘agency theories’ played little role not only in improvisational theater but more generally 
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in ‘conversational behaviour’ and he severed the link between intentionality and emergence 
altogether by insisting that, 
‘emergent properties are usually associated with the unintended effects of action; effects that are intended are, by 
definition, not emergent because their origin can be traced to the individual’s motivations and the advanced plans 
of specific individuals. In spite of the lack of plans and intentions, actors are able to coordinate their actions to 
generate a plausible, coherent dialogue and stable macropatterns emerge’ (Sawyer 2005, 184 original emphasis). 
 
This, though, did not really cohere with his own research because, although it is true that ‘stable 
macropatterns’ were not consciously planned by actors in terms of the end-product of the 
improvised ‘scene’, the actual ‘turns’ of each individual actor, formed part of an intentional 
process of rule-learning and rule-following. So, despite Sawyer’s many pronouncements that 
SC did not ‘require any commitment to intentionality or agency’ it could be argued that a more 
coherent account of SC was the dialectical one. For this account, ‘social constraint’ depends 
upon ‘a dialectic between downward causation and emergence processes’ with the individual 
properties of agency and intentionality constituting the ‘emergence processes’. If this account 
is accepted then it seems logical to equate ‘emergence processes’ with the notion of ‘upward 
causation’ and to interpret their properties as individual. 
Sawyer, therefore, provided one plausible way to make sense of Durkheim’s legacy: ‘social 
facts constrain individuals, but at the same time they emerge from the actions and interactions 
of those very same individuals’ (Sawyer 2002b, 238). Returning to Figure 1 and his theater 
research: the end-product of the whole ‘scene’ (S*) supervenes upon the individual properties 
of the individual ‘turns’ signified by the ‘emergence processes’ of the dotted vertical lines 
connecting I to S and I* to S* (upward causation). These comprise the individual properties of 
agency and intentionality. If these properties are not conceived as having causal power and if 
the interpretation of Durkheim that is preferred is the deterministic one then it becomes hard to 
conceive of individual properties as agential in a theory that is not really SC, but is, rather,  a 
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theory of structural determinism. That seems to be an unacceptable conclusion for a theory 
which took as its foundation the axiom that ‘only individuals exist’ (Sawyer 2002a, 537). 
That said, if Social Emergence is not interpreted in isolation but as part of a corpus including 
the other articles between 2001 and 2005 and the group creativity books, there remains a 
confusion in Sawyer. At one and the same time he advocated a materialism of individuals which 
dispensed with other materialities, whilst, nonetheless, with part of his interpretation of 
Durkheim, holding to a theory of which rendered individuals epiphenomenal. One path through 
the confusion may be to retain the dialectical version of Durkheim; that way SC remains a 
viable version of social causation which is informed by philosophy but remains empirically 
plausible. 
 Multiple Realization and Wild Disjunction 
Sawyer’s theater research also raised questions about multiple realization and wild disjunction, 
questions echoed at the macro-level by Archer’s historical sociology. In the 2013 Introduction 
to her Social Origins of Educational Systems,7 Archer pointed out that despite the empirical 
detail in her 800-page long history of the emergence of ‘state education systems’ (SES),8 such 
minutiae did not warrant the invocation of ‘wild disjunction’. Certainly, the comparative 
history of English, Danish, French, and Russian education between 1789 and 1975 was 
multiply realized within and between each society; nonetheless, Archer considered the 
application of Sawyer’s concept of wild disjunction to be ‘wildly inappropriate’ (Archer 2013, 
22). Archer understood multiple realization in terms of ‘action sequences’ the interactions of 
which could be ‘systematically related to the development of state education systems and to 
                                               
7 Hereafter, just referred to as Social Origins. 
8 State Education Systems are just referred to as SES (or SESs to signify use in the plural) from this point on in 
the text. 
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their relational organizing structures’ (ibid.). But ‘wild disjunctures’, she insisted, ‘never enter 
the picture’ (ibid.).  
The centrepiece of Archer’s history was the supplanting of premodern systems of theological 
pedagogy by modern systems of state-directed education, which were demarcated into those 
that were centralized (France and Russia) and those that were decentralized (England and 
Denmark). This led to distinctive patterns of interaction involving social groups, centrally the 
State and, for example, the emerging teaching profession, who were in contrasting ways trying 
to ‘bring about educational change’ (ibid., 421). Although the development of ‘multiply 
integrated state systems’ (ibid., 245) was complex, especially in decentralized nations such as 
England, Archer showed how the political activism of the teaching profession was 
‘systematically related’ (ibid., 22) to educational change in the period following the Education 
Acts of 1902, 1918, and 1944 (ibid., 501-640). So, for Archer’s historical sociology, it was a 
case of multiple realization but not wild disjunction. 
Sawyer’s theater research, in fact, led to a similar conclusion, this time at the micro-level. The 
empirical referents of Sawyer’s study – small groups of actors and their communication 
patterns – were not as complex as Archer’s and it is questionable whether even multiple 
realization applied let alone wild disjunction. Sawyer, though, certainly demonstrated SC: the 
end-result of an improvised ‘scene’ could not be explained by the individual properties 
manifested by each actor’s ‘turn’; it also required the emergent social property of the 
‘interactional frame’ constraining the actors. But, as Sawyer showed, the relation of the 
individual to the social properties was eminently detectable via qualitative research. It is true 
that he identified no less than ‘eight different “improv” games’, which his actors drew on as 
learning resources; in that sense, a ‘scene’ was multiply realized. But Sawyer was equally clear 
that his research had ‘been able to identify regularities that explain many of the interaction 
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patterns of these dialogues’ (Sawyer 2003b, 240) so that, to paraphrase Archer, wild disjunction 
never entered the dramaturgical picture. These examples suggest that wild disjunction may not 
be as ‘characteristic of the relationship between the social and the individual’ (Sawyer 2003a, 
216) as Sawyer contended. They also suggest that its absence need not undermine the causal 
relevance of SC. 
This is not to say that Sawyer failed to theorize scenarios where multiple realization and wild 
disjunction might not apply. On the contrary, in a 2004 symposium on the philosophy of Mario 
Bunge, he argued that an individualistic explanation could be appropriately applied to a social 
property if the individual properties on which it supervened were ‘meaningfully related’ 
(Sawyer 2004, 268). However, this created another inconsistency with his theater research: 
given that he clearly identified meaningful regularities between his improvised ‘scenes’ as a 
social property and the rule-following individual properties upon which they supervened, then 
the individual properties could hardly be said to be wildly disjunctive. But Sawyer did not infer 
from this - as he might have done given his arguments from the Bunge article - an MI 
explanation of ‘improv’. On the contrary, he still insisted that the ‘collaborative efforts of the 
entire group’ exhibited SC (Sawyer 2005, 182; see also Sawyer 2012, 274). So, despite his 
theoretical position that wild disjunction was a probable feature of SC, it seems that social 
properties could be causally effective even when wild disjunction did not ‘enter the picture.’ 
This analysis suggests that wild disjunction as an aspect of Sawyer’s theory should be 
discarded. Nonetheless, it is worth probing further Archer’s remarks apropos SESs and wild 
disjunction. In practice, Archer’s history dealt relatively little with individual properties; 
insofar as individuals were part of her narrative - for, example, H.A.L. Fisher, the Liberal 
Education Minister and architect of the 1918 Education Act in Lloyd George’s government - 
they were invariably treated as representatives of a social group (in Fisher’s case, a political 
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party) in interaction with other groups (for example, local authorities, who were hostile to the 
1918 Act) (Archer 2013, 599-602). On the other hand, Archer acknowledged that what she 
called the ‘incremental pattern’ of twentieth century educational change in decentralized 
systems like England (ibid., 699-710) partly depended upon ‘personal [pedagogical] 
experiments on the part of individual teachers’ (ibid., 702), which through the ‘political 
manipulation’ of their representative groups (such as their trade union, the National Union of 
Teachers [NUT]) resulted in ‘macroscopic change’ (ibid., 701-702). Mindful of such empirical 
facts, Archer’s discussion of the individualism-collectivism debate in the 1979 Introduction to 
Social Origins did not dismiss MI; rather, she accepted that, ‘the actions of individuals are the 
causal origins of complex phenomena’ (ibid., 64), but because in the case of SESs, ‘we are 
unable to know what the causal chain is’ (ibid.) then the reductive approach was held to be 
‘unconvincing when dealing with large-scale complex problems’ (ibid., 40). Although, unlike 
Sawyer, Archer was not sympathetic to the use of philosophical analogy, these comments do 
sound something like wild disjunction, so the fact that they ‘did not enter the picture’ may have 
been as much to do with a macro-sociological commitment to the ‘study of groups and 
institutions’ (ibid., 53) as it was to a rejection of the ontology of wild disjunction. 
Methodologically, given the requirements of an 800-page history, it is hard to see what the 
explanatory relevance of wild disjunction could possibly be, although this does not rule it out 
on ontological grounds. 
Synchronic and diachronic 
Finally, there remains the issue of history and causal relations. The context of this issue is 
Sawyer’s relation to Archer. 
Sawyer saw an affinity between SC and Archer’s critical realism (Sawyer 2003a, 218-219). 
This included commitments to sociological collectivism and scepticism about MI. Given that 
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Archer’s historical sociology of the 1970s was a major research programme, Sawyer was 
correct in recognizing a shared understanding that ‘the resolution of the emergence question 
requires empirical research’ (Sawyer 2001, 569). But it was over the causal status of history 
that they sharply diverged. 
Sawyer argued that SC mandated a synchronic account of social causation. Archer’s diachronic 
account of ‘morphogenesis’ or ‘emergence over time’ (ibid., 570), was dismissed because it 
did not cohere with his ‘philosophical account’ (Sawyer 2001) of SC. Viewed through the lens 
of historical sociology, Sawyer’s account seems excessively hermetic. Expressed in the 
language of Figure 1: 
‘even though social property S [at time t1] is emergent from a process that occurred at t-1 and before, it must 
nonetheless be supervenient on individual properties at time t1 due to token event identity...the supervenience 
account of token event identity requires a present synchronous account’ (ibid.). 
 
If such a view were correct it would render ‘analytical histories of emergence’ (Archer 2013, 
19) in the case considered here Archer’s history of SESs, of only contextual, but not causal, 
significance. But is it correct? The answer is probably no, and there are theoretical and 
empirical reasons for it. 
Figure 1 depicts an abstract model of social causation. It is an ahistorical snapshot of a 
structural moment in time and, as such, it is possible to contest it in terms of E.P. Thompson’s 
critique of those ‘sociologists who have stopped the time-machine’ and, modifying Thompson, 
to claim that Sawyer had forgotten that social causation is a ‘happening’ that only occurs ‘in 
the medium of time’ (Thompson 1965, 357). There was some of Thompson’s exasperation in 
Archer’s response to Sawyer in 2013 (Archer 2013, 21-22).9 But her substantive rejoinder was 
                                               
9 The other antagonist in Archer’s 2013 Introduction to Social Origins was Dave Elder-Vass who she accused of 
erecting a dichotomy between the synchronic and the diachronic (Archer 2013, 22-24). However, in most respects, 
Elder-Vass’s core claim (2010, 6) that, ‘social structure is best understood as the causal power of social groups’ 
is very close to Archer’s theory as outlined here. 
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to emphasise how causation was always connected to ‘agential “doings”’ from which social 
properties emerge, exercise constraint and are reproduced and resisted, as she said, ‘second-
by-second’ (ibid., 23) ‘in the medium of time’. Archer repeatedly emphasised how ‘the theories 
we develop to account for education and educational change are theories about the educational 
activities of people’ (ibid., 30). If histories of emergence are histories of the ‘activities of 
people’ and causation is comprised of such activities, then it is possible to see, contra Sawyer, 
how there could be a continuity between the diachronic and the synchronic and how the latter 
as Archer claimed would be ‘incomprehensible without allowing for this continuity’ (ibid., 23). 
The diachronic and synchronic aspects of causation are continuous, she argued, because both 
supervene upon the activities of individuals and groups. 
On its own, that last sentence is a truism; but Social Origins also provides many examples of 
this ‘activity-dependence’ (ibid., 22) of causation and gives empirical substance to Archer’s 
‘continuity’ thesis. Again, one example is the emergence of the teaching profession in England 
following the Education Act of 1902. What are now called primary and secondary school 
teachers emerged from the decentralized SES in the twentieth century with a ‘better bargaining 
position’ (ibid., 439) vis-a-vis the central State compared to the previous period. This was 
further enhanced in the intervals between the main legislative landmarks of the century, partly 
through the collective agency of the NUT. Thus, through a process of ‘internal initiation’ (ibid., 
426) based on the causal powers wielded by the teachers themselves, they achieved advances 
in pay, autonomy, and professional status. At the same time, however, and again via legislation, 
the State itself partly achieved ‘the unification and systematization’ of the SES through 
provision of a common ‘educational ladder’ between primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education which aspired to ‘the equalization of educational opportunity’ (ibid., 807-809). 
Archer characterized the interactions of the school teachers and the State as one of ‘centrifugal’ 
versus ‘centripetal’ forces (ibid., 803-808). 
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In this contest between two forms of constraint - between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors - which is 
the synchronic element and which is the diachronic? The question seems easy to answer if 
Sawyer’s Figure 1 is consulted, for the diachronic elements would have to be placed to one 
side because ‘supervenience does not apply to processes of causal determination over time’ 
(Sawyer 2003a, 210) and, instead, the focus would be on single events, for example, those 
surrounding the publication of the Plowden Report in 1965 which Archer regarded as the 
‘pinnacle of the liberal NUT influence over professional values’ (Archer 2013, 588). 
Methodologically, this seems justifiable; for Sawyer (2002a, 541) argued that it was ‘events 
which are the relata of causal transactions’ - but, nonetheless, this would not seem to be an 
effective way of delivering a history of emergence unless a sociologist was willing, as 
Thompson (1965, 357) advised them, ‘to throw across the time-switch again’ after the analysis 
of one specific ‘event’. Here, it has to be borne in mind that, for Archer, what characterized 
decentralized SESs compared to centralized SESs was that social change occurred gradually in 
the former according to an ‘incremental pattern’ in the absence of revolutionary change (Archer 
2013, 697-710).  This pattern was both synchronic and diachronic. Archer argued that once a 
diachronic process resulted in an emergent SES then this new higher-level property had a 
synchronic effect: 
‘to me, “one of the main antecedent effects of structures... consists of dividing the population... into those with 
vested interests in maintenance and change according to the positions in which they find themselves 
involuntarily”. This is how the diachronic segues into the synchronic and the latter is incomprehensible without 
allowing for this continuity’ (Archer, 2013: 22-23).10 
 
Archer, then, was wary of erecting ‘a wall between the diachronic and the synchronic’ (ibid., 
23) for which the emergence of a new social structure was diachronic and what came after was 
synchronic. Hence, she theorised diachronic and synchronic processes as ‘both always in play’ 
(ibid.) and she fleshed out the empirical detail of this interaction. Thus, in the case of the 
                                               
10 The secondary reference here is Archer quoting from herself in Realist Social Theory (1995, 203) 
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Plowden Report, the negotiating strength of the NUT, instantiated in the previous decades, was 
a causal factor in achieving ‘the high water mark of professional normative consensus’ (ibid., 
588) but this resulted, synchronically, in a new, emergent situation in which the ‘relevant 
population’ was ‘redivided’ again (ibid., 24). In this situation the teaching profession responded 
to its success with a ‘polarization of values’ (ibid., 763): some, under the impetus of the 1960s 
counter-culture, sought further radicalization whilst others sought only to maintain their gains. 
The State, by contrast, tried to win back central authority through political manipulation and 
by effectively halting the power of the NUT by the use of ‘polity-directed changes’ (ibid., 642-
657). For Archer, what was ‘continuous’ in the interactions of these push/pull tendencies were 
the ‘educational activities’ of, on the one hand the State, and on the other hand, the NUT. But 
there was no dichotomy between diachronic processes and synchronic events because after the 
Plowden Report, diachrony, in the form of the NUT’s bargaining power, did ‘not cease’ but 
continued to form a part of the ongoing ‘relational organizing’ of the SES (ibid., 24). This is 
what Archer meant by the continuity of the diachronic and the synchronic. 
This analysis indicates that Archer, unlike Sawyer, had no difficulty theorising materialities 
other than individuals. Without ignoring the activities of individuals such as teachers, her 
history was predicated upon the interactions of collectives (for example, political parties, the 
NUT), the State (polity-directed policy) and the law (the Education Acts). Legislation and 
policy were analysed as higher-level properties emergent from the social interactions of 
competing social groups within the context of the ‘relational organising structures’ which 
comprised the SES. 
One final question is whether Social Origins is compatible with SC? This question concerns 
the relationship between empirical research and theory, which so exercised Sawyer. Given her 
remarks in the 1979 Introduction that ‘the actions of individuals are the causal origins of 
complex phenomena’ (ibid., 64) it would seem that NRI applied although it was social 
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properties rather than individual properties that were the emphases of Archer’s analysis. 
Archer’s history seems compatible with NRI provided NRI is conceptualised as a subsumed 
category of ontological materialism. SC, though, is more problematic. Insofar as SC depends 
upon wild disjunction, Archer expressly denied its application to Social Origins. But if one 
could conceptualise a ‘rock bottom’ individualistic account of the development of SESs in four 
countries over a period of nearly two centuries, it undoubtedly would be so heterogeneous as 
to count as wildly disjunctive. It would also be far longer than 800 pages. But, of course, 
Sawyer had a much more specialised meaning in mind derived from Fodor and a particular 
perspective on scientific concept-formation. Again, Archer’s SESs are clearly multiply realised 
but this did not imply wild disjunction. On the contrary, Archer was clear that ‘long-term 
regularites’ (ibid., 803) could be identified between push and pull factors and these constituted 
a ‘continuous tension between diversification and standardization’ (ibid.). Sawyer thought that 
the acceptance of SC depended upon the ‘token identity’ thesis but Archer could easily accept 
this, considered as a general commitment to materialism. As a more specific commitment to a 
particular philosophical perspective, as a sociologist, she largely ignored it. It did not ‘enter the 
picture’. 
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the above critiques, the final question concerns what remains of sociological value in 
Sawyer’s theory of SC? These concluding remarks are organised in terms of those aspects of 
his theory which should be retained, modified, or discarded. 
To begin with the last aspect first. The most serious casualty of the critique is wild disjunction. 
It is the concept most closely aligned to the philosophical account of causation but the one that 
would seem to have the least empirical application in terms of the research projects considered 
here. Neither Archer nor (surprisingly) Sawyer required the concept in delivering their 
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findings; nor did their findings infer the concept’s necessity. Wild disjunction, then, may have 
minimal sociological value, although the empirical evidence offered in this article is limited to 
the research analyzed. In itself, this does not rule out the possibility that society is so 
ontologically complex as to be wildly disjunctive in nature, nor that the causes of some social 
phenomenon are themselves so heterogeneous that they resist analysis in terms of empirical 
regularities. If Sawyer (2012, 272) was right that questions of causation ‘cannot be debated 
strictly on a theoretical level’ then ongoing evaluation of its heterogeneity (or not) may have 
to proceed on a case by case basis. Judged solely on the research analysed here, however, the 
prospects for wild disjunction are not high. 
Multiple realization fares slightly better. It is certainly possible to see the main referents of both 
Sawyer’s and Archer’s research - the ‘scene’ in Sawyer, SESs in Archer - as multiply realized, 
in terms of improvised ‘turns’ in the former and ‘relational organising structures’ in the latter. 
But only in the former does this correspond to multiple realization as derived by Sawyer (2001) 
from his ‘philosophical account’; that is, as a social property that is multiply realized in 
individual properties. This works well for ‘improv’ theater where the ‘scene’ is multiply 
realized in each actor’s ‘turns’; but the concept has to be stretched to work in Archer. Certainly, 
a social structure such as a SES instantiates social properties which are themselves multiply 
realized - but not prominently in individual properties. Rather, SESs were multiply realized in 
other social properties such as the bargaining power of the NUT or the political manipulations 
of the State. Archer did acknowledge examples of social properties being instantiated in 
individual properties; but the general picture from Archer is one of social structures 
instantiating social properties. Again, the notion of multiple realization here owes nothing to 
Sawyer’s philosophical analogy and the analysis of ‘big ones into little ones’ (SESs into the 
NUT, the State etc.) is a common methodology of theoretically-informed empirical analysis. If 
multiple realization is applicable in Social Origins, it seems so because of its general analytical, 
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rather than its philosophical, meaning. The conclusion is that it is not obvious, divorced from 
its connection to wild disjunction, that the philosophical account of multiple realisation is of 
sociological value. 
Apropos the debate over historical causation, Archer would seem to have the best of it. Whilst 
it could not be denied that history may be productively analysed in terms of ‘events’  - and 
there is a rich historiographical literature surrounding, for example, the interaction of 
‘continuities’ versus ‘discontinuities’ in the work of Michel Foucault (1969/2013) - Sawyer’s 
Figure 1 would seem to be an inadequate representation of the long-term and comparative 
history offered by Archer. Elsewhere, in the group creativity books, Sawyer did offer an 
explicit theorization of the interaction of the synchronic and the diachronic derived from G.H. 
Mead (Sawyer 2003c, 125-128; Mead 1934). This seemed persuasive for the micro-social 
scenarios there analyzed but, significantly, it did not find its way into his theory of SC or his 
critique of Archer. It would be of interest to attempt an integration of this account with 
something like Archer’s later account of ‘morphogenesis’ although that modification lies 
outside the scope of this critique. 
Sawyer’s customary deployment of the ‘philosophical account’ begs the question of whether 
his argument from analogy with the philosophy of mind itself emerges as a valuable component 
of a theory of causation. The issue is inseparable from his ‘contiguous levels of analysis’ 
(Sawyer 2003a, 218) argument. What this article has called his ‘fallacy of transposition’ 
signifies confusions at both the ontological and explanatory levels. Ontologically, what Sawyer 
adopted from the philosophy of mind was non-reductive materialism; but, as he transposed ‘up’ 
from the physical/mental level to the individual/social level, this became ‘ontological 
individualism’ (cf. Greve 2012, 2013). Apart from wanting to avoid the reification of social 
structures, it is not clear why Sawyer chose to give primacy to a narrow version of 
individualism over materialism in general, but it left him unable to theorise collectives except 
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as abstractions such as ‘being a church’ (Sawyer 2002a, 542-551). In explanatory terms, he 
was left with a paradox: the supervenience relation, based upon the analogy with ‘hierarchically 
ordered sets of properties’ (Sawyer 2001, 553), worked well as an explanation of ‘improv’ 
theater via the notion of ‘property dualism’; but insofar as this included the agency of rule-
following actors this should not have been permissible because of the repeated assertion that 
SC ‘does not require...agency on the part of individuals’. What Sawyer may have required was 
a conception of individuals that was not so aligned to a narrow version of MI: candidates here 
include such notions as ‘inclusive individualism’ and ‘institutional individualism’, both already 
well-known in the early 2000s (for example, Agassi 1975; Lukes 1968). But as Julie Zahle has 
pointed out, once the scope of these are granted then the ‘levels of analysis’ argument is 
weakened; for if individual properties are not confined to an individual-level but, on the 
contrary, ‘span multiple levels’ (Zahle 2019) then the explanatory efficacy of the levels 
approach seems no longer persuasive. This, though, does not really undermine Sawyer’s group 
creativity research: for it is there, much more than in the abstractions of Figure 1, that the value 
of supervenience and emergence themselves emerge. The emergent social properties of the 
improvised ‘scene’ depended upon the individual ‘turns’ of the actors on which it supervened. 
Yet the success of this explanation owes little to the notion of ‘contiguous levels’; it simply 
requires the materiality of a micro-social world in which individuals instantiate properties that 
are both individual and social. ‘Property dualism’, then, seems to be the enduring concept of 
value; not two (or many) ontological levels. 
What should be retained from Sawyer are the dialectical reading of Durkheim and his 
modification of Fodor, the insistence that, ‘for any given social phenomenon, the extent to 
which individualism or collectivism is a useful part of a complete explanation must be 
determined through empirical study’ (Sawyer 2003a, 219). Judged in terms of the examples 
considered in this article, the former provides a flexible framework for both micro- and macro-
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research. The claim that ‘social properties of events can be causally related to individual 
properties’ (Sawyer 2003a , 204) is not radical but it is plausible. It has a double pay-off: it 
coheres with the ‘dialectical’ Durkheim (causation = ‘a form of constraint that is 
simultaneously undergoing processes of emergence’ [Sawyer 2002b, 238]); whilst having 
empirical application in the ‘improv’ situation where the ‘interactional frame’ supervenes upon 
‘rule following’ actors. The ‘improv’ situation does seem to share some general features of 
social interaction in terms of the applicability of ‘property dualism’. If it is a stretch to apply it 
to Archer, this is because historical processes are not just ‘events’ and because although it could 
not be denied that the social properties of SESs were instantiated in individual properties, the 
notion of ‘educational activity’ references a supervenience relation for which ‘groups and 
institutions’ constitute the appropriate methodological ‘base’. This proves nothing more than 
that SC, to modify Archer, (ibid., 40) may be ‘unconvincing when dealing with large-scale 
complex problems’. The consequences of this, however, are disappointing for Sawyer: SC, 
which was meant to defend ‘sociological collectivism’, may find its best application in the 
micro-studies at which Sawyer excelled. It remains valuable in facilitating ‘methodologically 
collectivist explanations for microsocial processes’ (Sawyer 2003a, 224). 
With regard to the empirical imperative in Sawyer, there is more that could be said. This 
concerns the question of the relation between the empirical and the theoretical in a theory of 
causation. One theme of this article has been that the theory stands in some need of the 
empirical arbitration of sociological research. It could be objected that that argument itself 
stands in need of justification and that the required arbitration should be stated, instead, in terms 
of a fidelity to the nuances of ordinary language usage in the Wittgensteinian tradition (for 
example, Tsilipakos, 2014, 2015). But if it is granted, Sawyer provided both positive and 
negative examples of arbitration in action. If theory requires empirical detail, then this should 
be reflected in the sociological examples chosen. In this respect, Sawyer failed when at his 
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most abstract - the macro-social adumbrated as ‘competitive team sports’ (Sawyer 2002a, 549-
551); the micro-social abstracted as ‘being an argument’ (ibid., 545); causation visualised as 
Figure 1 - but succeeded in the books on group creativity and in chapter nine of Social 
Emergence. The charge of incoherence in the provision of examples is not confined to Sawyer; 
it has also been applied to Elder-Vass (Hansson Wahlberg 2014ab; Tsilipakos 2014, 2015). 
Archer, on the other hand, thanks to the sociological detail of the SES project, rather immunised 
her future theoretical work against that particular  charge. 
  
Page 29 of 30 
 
References 
Agassi, J. (1975) “Institutional Individualism.” British Journal of Sociology, 26(2): 144-155. 
Archer, M.S. (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press. 
Archer, M.S. (2013) Social Origins of Educational Systems. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Durkheim, E. (1982) The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press. 
Elder-Vass, D. (2010) The Causal Power of Social Structures. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Fodor, J.A. (1974) “Special Sciences: (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” 
Synthese, 28(2): 97-115. 
Foucault, M. (2013) The Archaeology of Knowledge. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor Francis. 
Greve, J. (2012) “Emergence in Sociology: A Critique of Nonreductive Individualism.” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 42(2): 188-123. 
Greve, J. (2013) “Response to R. Keith Sawyer.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 43(2): 
246-256. 
Hansson Wahlberg, T. (2014a) “Elder-Vass on the Causal Power of Social Structures.” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44(6): 774-791. 
Hansson Wahlberg, T. (2014b) “Causally Redundant Social Objects: A Rejoinder to Elder-
Vass.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 4(6): 798-809 
Lukes, S. (1968) “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered.” British Journal of Sociology, 
19(2): 119-129. 
Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Sawyer, R.K. (2001) “Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Some 
Implications for Sociological Theory.” American Journal of Sociology, 107(3): 551-585. 
-------------------(2002a) “Nonreductive Individualism Part I: Supervenience and Wild 
Disjunction.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(4): 537-559. 
-------------------(2002b) “Durkheim’s Dilemma: Toward a Sociology of Emergence.” 
Sociological Theory, 20(2): 227-247. 
-------------------(2003a) “Nonreductive Individualism Part II: Social Causation.” Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences, 33(2): 203-224. 
-------------------(2003b) Improvised Dialogues: Emergence and Creativity in Conversation. 
Westport, CT: Aldex Publishing. 
-------------------(2003c) Group Creativity: Music, Theater, Collaboration. Mahwah, NJ: L. 
Erlbaum Associates. 
-------------------(2004) “The Mechanisms of Emergence.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
34(2): 260-282. 
Page 30 of 30 
 
-------------------(2005) Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
-------------------(2012) “Response to ‘Emergence in Sociology’.” Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 42(2): 270-275. 
Thompson, E. P. (1965) “The Peculiarities of the English.” The Socialist Register, 311-362. 
Tsilipakos, L. (2014) “Theoretical procedures and Elder-Vass’s Critical Realist Ontology.” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44(6): 752-773. 
Tsilipakos, L. (2015) “Realist Social Theory and its Losing Battle with Concepts.” Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences, 45(1): 26-52. 
Weber, M. (2013) Max Weber: Collected Methodological Writings. London: Routledge. 
Zahle, J. (2003) “The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the 
Argument from Multiple Realization.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33(1): 77-99. 
Zahle, J. (2016) “Methodological Holism in the Social Sciences.” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, E.N. Zalta, (ed.). URL: = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/holism-social/>. 
Zahle, (2019) “Limits to Levels in the Methodological Individualism-Holism Debate.” 
Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02469-2. 
 
Mark Cresswell is a sociologist specialising in the study of psychiatry, mental health, 
cinematic representations of ‘madness’, and general social theory. He has published many 
articles on his specialist subjects. 
  
 
